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Let no one suppose that these facts are put forward in order to evade the more important issue—the faulty foreign policy attributed to King Constantine. The advice tendered by some of those around him may have been partly at fault. But what I would ask my readers to bear in mind is this: The actual facts, all the details, the precise attitude of the King on one side, and M. Venizelos on the other—these important items in the controversy are not yet fully ascertained. Moreover, during the four years of the war hesitancy, mistrust, failing faith, faint-heartedness, doubt, and self-interest were manifested not in Greece only. Who has been, during the whole of that time, so steadfast and so unselfish as not to fear the scrutiny of some such unhappy interludes?

But let us face squarely and impartially the main and one important fact in this controversy. The differences which had arisen between King Constantine and M. Venizelos were not so much disagreements on policy as they were personal dislikes, arising out of incompatibility of temperament and varying conceptions of conduct. Had M. Venizelos chosen to exercise his fascinating persuasiveness he might have discovered a way to compromise. Unfortunately, his relations with the royal family of Greece were from the outset marked by hostility and harshness. Under his administration two of its members, King George and King Alexander, met with tragic deaths. Of course, no one will lay this down to M. Venizelos' account; it was his misfortune; but he might have avoided the quarrels which resulted in the forced abdication of Prince George from the governorship of Crete, and he could surely have prevented the bitter dispute which necessitated King Constantine's absence from Greece during three eventful years. M. Venizelos is a wise statesman and would, I believe, have followed a different policy from that which compelled him to place himself at the head of two revolutions had he not been incensed and irritated by the intrigues and innuendoes of unscrupulous and self-seeking followers.

These same men are now clamoring for another upset in Greece—they want to set up a republic. With characteristic absence of good sense, they do not tell us what is the matter with the liberties now enjoyed by the Greek people, or what they propose to add to those liberties, or what sort of a republic they project. They only tell us it will not be on the American model. I should think not! For a president of a republic, invested with the powers an American President wields, would not be tolerated in Greece for so much as four months, let alone four years.

The people of Greece enjoy, in many ways, wider liberties than those of the United States; but there is no people less fit for a republican form of government than the Greeks. We are the most democratic people in Europe; but we have the sense of equality developed to such a pitch, we are *égalitaires* to such an extent, that we would not tolerate one of ourselves as President of the State, not for a twelve-month; and then we would have a republic of the traditional pattern of certain tropical republics. This is perfectly well understood by our newly inspired republicans; they themselves are perfect types of *égalité* and of insubordination to any authority. But, then, if they do not go on agitating frantically their *raison d'être* would be gone!

We want no more of such nuisances. We want no more agitations and upsets. We want no more factious politics. Good Greeks serve neither parties nor persons. We serve first our country and only our country—our country, right or wrong—and to serve her well we need peace and quietness, unity and absence of factions. He is a traitor who will not now, in the hour of danger, eschew partisanship, and work in concord and with unselfishness.

Dangers of all kinds face us from without. Our brave and victorious army, our brothers who have been under arms for nine consecutive years without so much as a whisper of complaint or a symptom of weariness, but with the noble cheer of successive victories—our army stands as a firm bulwark against that hoard of Kemalist cut-throats. But these professional butchers of women and children are now being strengthened afresh by those whom we were wont to honor as the defenders of liberty and civilization. It is not with dissertations about the best form of a republic that we shall ward off this danger. We must rely on ourselves and be ready with sacrifices. And the country is best served by those who offer as sacrifice their pet schemes and their personal preferences. We must support the established régime in Greece, being mindful of this all-important fact, often forgotten or ignored: The concessions and promises in favor of Hellenism recorded in the Treaty of Sevres were not made to M. Venizelos personally, but to Greece; and without the people of Greece at the back of him, M. Venizelos would not have obtained them. As long, therefore, as his successor to the premiership enjoys the confidence of the country, he is the leader we must follow in the circumstances in which the country finds itself now.

I hope I have not deviated from my promise at the outset—to state the truth squarely and impartially. I have endeavored to do so undeterred by the result, almost invariably in such cases, of displeasing both parties.

SUPERFICIALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By JACKSON H. RALSTON

PERHAPS there is some branch of legal knowledge which has received less analysis than has international law, but it does not at the moment appear what that branch may be. The books, to all intents and purposes, fail to cover the differences between ordinary usages and conventional agreements; between adjective law and the basic laws by which, consciously or unconsciously, masses of mankind embodied into States are controlled—laws which when violated bring inevitable punishment. Little attention is given to the penal and natural sanctions which follow the breaking of international law. The State is treated as if it were a non-moral institution, not subject to the workings of any law higher than itself. Such a non-moral thing as a rock is constructed according to and controlled by the operations of a great variety of natural laws. Writers have been strangely blind to the fact that a State is but an aggregation of human units, just as the rock is an aggregation of atoms, and that it is not freed from the

laws surrounding individual and collective human existence. Wrongs which may be inflicted by and upon individuals are not changed into rights because the State is brought into action.

The student is perplexed and appalled by the apparent complexity of international law—a complexity which exists largely, however, only in the minds of its professors and not in the subject itself. He is furnished with no clew with which to find his way out of the labyrinth. He is told that the sources of international law are to be found in the writings of eminent authors, in the practices of nations, and in conventional agreements between nations, such as are ordinarily embodied in treaties. He is not warned that much of such so-called law is but the crystallization of wrong-doing on the part of nations. It is largely left to him to discover, unaided, that he has been given mere enumerations of facts, and not the results of diligent study as to the nature of law itself. He is taught that there can be such a thing as the laws of war despite the fact that the usages of war contain none of the attributes of law.

The student, relying upon the instructions of a professor who has not been trained to use his own mind, will be encouraged to believe that a State is a creature outside and beyond law, sovereign in itself, and that, like the king, it can do no wrong. He must himself discover that this conception of a State is medieval, feudal and aristocratic—assuredly not democratic. At the same time that he is assured States are sovereign in their foreign relations, he is told that equality exists between them—two ideas utterly irreconcilable. The sovereign knows no higher law. Equals may not, without violating equality, seek forcibly to impose their wills upon each other. If they do, then they violate law—real international law.

Thus the student has little reason to believe that there is such a thing as basic international law—law which may not be disobeyed except at the cost of damage to the State itself and to humanity at large. It is not given him to learn that there may be a comparative jurisprudence attaching to international law. The only exception to this is the casual suggestion that the United States is a Union of States resembling in their interrelations nations at large and from whose workings suggestive information may be drawn. But, if the subject is pursued, even here emphasis is laid almost exclusively upon the Union's system of federal courts. The real source of the strength of the Union—the freedom of intercourse and traffic between the States—receives scant notice, and the unlawfulness (in nature) of interference with commerce between nations is ignored. The penalties for the breaking of this law in international relations remains unperceived.

Due to our lack of imagination, no basis is found for a comparative jurisprudence dealing with the law controlling the State as an organized nation of men and the law controlling individuals. It is entirely overlooked that, in the slow processes of the ages, we have worked out a basis of human right which may not be ignored when we consider the State at large. Mankind has discovered, as to the individual, that he may not murder or steal; that such offenses are unsocial, and therefore prohibited by natural law and punished, directly and

corporeally, by the civil law. It has further been discovered that the individual possesses natural rights—rights that we know are natural, because their infringement brings, sooner or later, punishment upon the infringer, whether a person or a State. Nevertheless, no comparative jurisprudence has yet taught international law writers that theft of possessions and murder of their owners committed by a State, a multitude of individuals, is as unsocial an act as when like offenses are committed by a single individual.

Apparently, no international law writer will recognize these and countless other facts and appreciate the lessons to be drawn from them until the data of international law—real international law—have been collected and arranged and their bearings understood. So far, this work has not been done either systematically or intelligently. We do not speak a true language of international law, but a jumble of sounds which we have not resolved into their component elements.

International lawyers as yet are without a clear test which they can apply to the facts of a new situation and determine from its probable results, as shown by experience, what may be the righteous course to pursue. If through their faulty vocabulary and store of misunderstood facts they can find no analogy, they are lost in approaching the question. They do not know whether to test it by the gallon, bushel, wind gage, pressure gage, weather-cock, Ten Commandments, or by the principles of Machiavelli. They are worse off than a case lawyer confronting strange conditions.

The votaries of the international law of today write grave books for the edification of the student about the events of any war which may have passed over the world, and their manner of so doing will serve to illustrate how counsel is darkened. The political facts leading up to the war receive the fullest, though often unenlightened, treatment. The interests controlling political action are slightly passed over or ignored. The more remote origins of the dispute are not traced out. The immediate events, which are results and not beginnings, are treated as the groundwork of the trouble culminating in war. Nothing of a fundamental character is developed, informing the reader or student as to the rights originally violated or the rights proposed to be violated by the institution of war; for, throughout, the non-moral conception of the State influences or prevents thought.

The learned authors gravely consider whether the outbreak was preceded by a declaration of hostilities, or whether the killings commenced without warning, and which would have been the proper course. They discuss the development of contraband which the war has brought about, ignoring the fact that this is equivalent to a discussion as to whether, a man's coat being taken, his vest should likewise go to the thief, and, if so, whether the watch should accompany the vest. The occasion arising, much time is spent over the law of blockade, and it is discovered whether it has been changed or modified by the events of the war. The fact is overlooked that the alleged law of blockade permits interference with the right of the neutral to trade with one of the combatants, and, justifying violation of a natural right, cannot be classed as a sound law.

The writers discuss the use of dum-dum or explosive

bullets, gas, and other methods of human extinction and seek to discover which is the most in accordance with Christian usage and, let us assume, the Sermon on the Mount. They examine the facts as to the levy of contributions upon the civil populations by the several armies, but any doubt as to the entire honesty of this practice is never expressed.

As to what they regard as rules controlling the use of balloons, airplanes, bombs, and submarine mines, they call the changed practice a development of law. The rights of neutrals are constantly described by them as increased or lessened through the actions of the combatants. No question as to the right of the fighter to subordinate the interests of a peaceful nation to his wishes seems to arise.

In doing these several things they do not cite the conclusions of any tribunal in which the life or well-being of men is regarded of any moment, or cite from any legal decision at all, except it be the dicta of the prize courts of the parties in conflict.

They think that they are developing law when they are merely setting down a narrative of facts concerning violations of the rights of untrammelled human existence, violations which are the negation of law. The reservation might be made that these facts do have the subtle relation to the written or unwritten law which the acts of a criminal have to that moral rule he has violated. As furnishing data for real international law, they are exactly comparable with the criminal history of Jack Shepherd or with accounts of the exploits of those who have perished on Tyburn Hill.

The books being published, the reviewers pronounce them to be "notable contributions to the science of international law"—a commendation to which no criticism may be offered except that the volumes are not scientific and that they have no relation to real law.

It is not just to say that the writers of these tomes have performed utterly useless labor. There is probably sufficient reason for the classification and recordation of even the most unsavory events. But take this work for what it is, and do not associate it in any way, save as a warning, with what may be classified as international law. The real duty of the collector of the data of international law, upon whose work the jurist must predicate his expositions of law, is not far different from that of the actor, whose place it is to hold, "as 'twere, the mirror up to Nature; to show Virtue her own feature, Scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure."

Bearing in mind and applying this Shakespearean suggestion, take this concrete example: In 1912 a war broke out between Italy and Tripoli. Italian troops invaded Tripoli and finally conquered the country. What should be the attitude of the historian of international events toward this war, and what would he find to examine and discuss? He would consider the causes of the war, inquiring particularly whether or not Italian statesmen believed Tripoli to be a land of potential wealth. He would examine, and perhaps discover, what important Italian business interests desired profit in Tripoli in the way of control of natural resources, extension of banking institutions, concessions for railways and other means of commerce, and what other business and mercantile institutions regarded it as a fruitful field for

their endeavors. He would inquire curiously as to whether or not there was an interlocking political and business directorate controlling Italian politics; whether or not the interrelation was represented by the same people or those intimately allied with them, or whether or not there existed financial obligations on the part of the politician toward the business men. He would discover whether or not there was a jealousy between those whom we courteously call Italian statesmen toward other countries because of the processes of subjugation in north Africa which had been carried on by England, France, and Spain. It would be a matter of moment to him whether or not, as against those nations, Italy was claiming her share of the loot in a field the conquest of which was regarded as relatively easy, and whether or not this conquest was claimed by Italians and regarded by politicians in other nations as Italy's compensation for her good nature while those countries were gaining control of resources in a land comparatively near to Italy. He would investigate as to whether or not an artificial desire among the people for the occupancy of Tripoli had been cultivated through artful repetitions of the fact that 1,500 to 2,000 years before the old Roman Empire had subdued it. His interest would be excited if he found that the idea had been disseminated among the Italian peasantry that Tripoli was a land of large mineral and agricultural resources, from the possession of which workers in the fields and mines of the Peninsula might hope to gain. He would want to know whether or not minor elements had been appealed to for the purpose of influencing public sentiment in Italy, as, for instance, whether or not the contempt which people of one religion are ready to bestow upon people of another religion had been systematically stirred up, and whether or not an analogous racial contempt so easily brought to the surface had been excited, these not as direct causes of the war, but as stimuli to bring men to the point of slaughter. Catchy but elusive watchwords, created for the occasion, would not be overlooked.

Turning to the results of the war, the writer would strive to estimate the value of the "imponderables," as they are termed, such as the hatred and contempt which the war would attach to the name of Italy in the minds of Moslems, and to give full weight to the thoughts of enmity and revenge created among a subject people, thoughts destined sooner or later to find their outlet. He would measure the direct monetary loss to Italy and the burdens placed upon Italian subjects for which they could never hope to have a return. He would try to gage the damage done by the withdrawal of men from industrial pursuits to the ways of destruction, this as affecting the direct physical loss and the necessary moral degeneration. He would not fail to examine into the effect of the war upon the commercial and political relations of Italy with other nations.

In estimating, on the other side, the benefits, if he could find any, he would inquire whether or not the war had, after all, given an enlarged field of labor for the toiling millions of Italy, and whether or not its financial benefits had inured to an exceedingly small circle of Italian financiers, while the whole burden fell upon the shoulders of those who were already sufficiently oppressed.

This examination might well be multiplied as many

times as wars have been indulged in for the past fifty years. Thus would be furnished a tremendous amount of data available to all peoples disposed to enter upon armed conflict. It is entirely safe to say that with this data gathered together new proof would be afforded that aggressive war cannot be carried on, and even what Grotius called "a just war" cannot be indulged in, without bringing terrible punishment upon the nations concerned. After all, we shall add but little to the wisdom of the poet who wrote:

When thou hearest the fool rejoicing, and he saith, "It is over and past,
And the wrong was better than right, and hate turns into love at the last,
And we strove for nothing at all, and the Gods are fallen asleep;
For so great is the world agrowing that the evil good shall reap;"
Then loosen thy sword in the scabbard and settle the helm on thine head,
For men betrayed are mighty, and great are the wrongfully dead.

And thus it is that war breeds war, and we become involved in a vicious circle, recognized as legitimate by the international law writers, but in which justice as between man and man, between nation and nation, plays no part.

AN APPEAL TO CHRISTIANS FOR STARVING RUSSIA

By SAMUEL McCREA CAVERT

IN AN area bigger than our entire Atlantic seaboard—no food! In the region of the Volga today hunger on a vaster scale than known within the memory of man!

At least fifteen million peasants in Russia starving to death! Plain, cold facts, corroborated by the head of the American Relief Administration. "The worst famine in the history of the world," Mr. Hoover calls it.

Rubbish carts going around to collect the dead bodies of children every day. Peasants trying to subsist on a bread composed of withered grass or powdered bark. Incredible, but true—confirmed by the representatives of the Quakers in that land of the shadow of death.

And twelve dollars will save a life till harvest time. How many *lives of Russian children* are we spending in needless luxuries? Surely, we need a deeper conscience on the sin of selfish luxury when others are dying for lack of what we recklessly waste. For our own sake we dare not be so callous as to ignore their cry. It would mean a famine of the soul worse than the famine of the body that the Russians face.

"And then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungered and ye gave me meat."

The standard of judgment is the way we have treated another. What if we should have to hear: "Inasmuch as ye did it not to the least of these, my brethren, ye did it not to me."

Dare we say before that Judgment-seat that the Rus-

sians are only getting what they deserve? Are we to punish little children for the mistakes of their fathers? Are the peasants to blame for the overwhelming drought? And are we to forget that Russia gave far more lives in the World War for freedom than any other nation, and gave them in those critical days before we had ourselves come in—gave till utterly exhausted and a suffering people was plunged into revolution? In a very real sense Russia gave those lives in our stead. What are we now to do for her? In the fine words of President Harding, "We must put aside considerations of international politics and fundamental differences in government. The big thing is the call of the suffering and the dying." To that call the Christian people of America, above all others, ought to make reply.

THE EXCITEMENT OF IRISH PEACE

The treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, reported in the last issue of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE*, was duly ratified on December 16 in the British Parliament by overwhelming majorities—156 to 47 in the House of Lords, and 401 to 58 in the House of Commons—but the expected prompt victory in the Dail Eireann did not materialize. It was not until January 7, after a protracted and bitter debate which threw the action of the body into uncertainty, that ratification was won, and the majority was only 64 to 57.

In both parliaments there were "die-hards." Lord Carson being notable in the British, with a passionate protest, but it was only in the Dail Eireann that, under the leadership of Eamonn de Valera, they made a real and formidable showing. De Valera began fighting almost as soon as the pact was signed in London by the commissioners. At first it was thought that he could do no more than create a flurry, so intense was the Irish desire that the incredibly terrible warfare, halted in the summer, should not be resumed, and so firm were many of the most ardent of the Irish leaders in the belief that the treaty gave the Irish people genuine freedom. But it soon appeared that he commanded a following of importance in the Dail, if not among the masses of the Irish people.

One reason given for his unexpected strength was that many of the members were men who had served in the Irish army and had become embittered in the most extreme degree. It also was a fact that he commanded vigorous support from members who were not of Irish birth—from champions of Irish freedom born in England and elsewhere, who had made the Irish cause their own. It is a somewhat singular fact that de Valera himself was not born on Irish soil.

Described by his friend, H. W. Nevins, who has been in Washington representing the *Manchester Guardian* at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, as being as rigid as an equilateral triangle, de Valera was in action as early as December 12 against the treaty giving a dominion status to Ireland, instead of the absolute divorcement from Britain that he sought. In a statement issued on that day, he denied emphatically that the honor of Ireland demanded that the Dail ratify the treaty to which the Irish commissioners had fixed their signatures. His statement was:

I have been asked whether the honor of Ireland is not involved in the ratification of the agreement arrived at. The honor of Ireland is not involved. The plenipotentiaries were sent on the distinct understanding that any agreement they